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ABSTRACT AND SUBSTANTIAL TI\IB 
Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley 
It is often claimed that one of the strengths of archaeology as a 
diseiplin1try oractice resides in its unique time depth. Indeed time is 
essential to archaeolo2y: it constitutes part of the reason for its 
existe11ce, One mlti:ht exoect that a discioline so deeply imolicated in 
and concerned with time to have a hic;rhly develooed theoretical under-
standinc;r of the nature of temporality and its relation to social 
totalities. Unfortunately, as in so many other areas, this is not the 
case . I In thi s paper we intend to oroblematise the nature of time and , 
in so doin'; , hope to dispel some of the 'innocence' involved in the 
treatment of temporality in contemporary archaeology. 
Abstract Time 
Time in archaeology has been regarded as largely unproblematic, 
somethin'; into which artifacts and sites may be slotted. It is simply 
considered and presented in terms of sequence and date , a dimension. To 
identify time as a dimension is to utilise a spatial metaphor. Time 
becomes location and distance, a framework in which the traces of the 
oast are locked uo and may be situated and ordered. 
Snatial linear or abstract time is an invention of recent date and 
can be relat;d to thP. development of caoitalism. Such time is commodif-
ied and constitutes the time of capitalist production. The time of the 
chronometer is a ti'lle constituted by an infinity of durationJess 
moments. It has an exchan';eable quality. As measurable, empty duration 
this time i s utterly seoarate from the human life that fills it , freely 
exch1tn';eab!e with 'lll other time. The time of the factory clock permits 
the exchan2e of Jabour and its product. Commodified time provides the 
medium and Jink between the commodified form of ~oods and commodified 
Jabour in the caoitalist oroduction orocess. This 'objective' time 
ooerates withi n an exoloitative economic system of social domination and 
is bound up with the su rveillance of the worke r and social control. It 
i s utterly seoara t e d fro m the individua l and marginalises subjective 
exoer ience. Such a commodified ti me implies the abolition of that time 
cr~a t ed by th e event of human consc iousness or human praetice - - th e 
flow of actions in and on the world in individualised or s u-bs tantial 
time. 
The commodified time of capitalist production provides 
a rchaeology's temporality. Thus a oarti cu lar and historically s pecific 
noti on of time i s accepted as a simole 'commonsense' notion of 
t emoorality: somethi ng to be applied t o document , to arrange the traces 
of the past. Acceptance of this not ion of time as obvious and unprob-
lematic safeguards the discursive soace of archaeolOfl'Y· Capitalism's 
(Archaeolo~ical Review from Cambrid~e 6:1 [1987)) 
r 
r. 
I 
..: 
r 
I 
r 
r 
I. 
I 
I. 
I 
f 
I. 
I 
I 
r 
r 
I 
r 
I 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r. 
33 
chronometry is regarded not as culturally specific but as automatically 
applicable to the entirety of humanity, past or present. Capita! i sm•s 
time becomes temporally imperialist. 
This abstract time forms the premise of traditional tyoololj'ical 
work in archaeologv, involvinll' the assumotion that the temooral classi-
fication of an artifact somehow orovides a clue to its meaning -- that 
such empty time explains. This time also oermits and encourages the 
production of an homo~enous history, a history that claims to be both 
about and relevant to t~e entirety of humanity, an history that does not 
recognise rupture and difference . It orovides justification for the 
'equal' treatment of human culture at all times and places: cross-
cultural generalisation and the comparative method. Such time all ows 
the construct~on of general classificatory stages, the compression of 
societies into evolutionary sequences. A qualitative view of 
substantial human time which would recognise difference is replaced by 
quantitative, classificatory time. Thus, all 'tribes' are considered as 
equal in a hierarchy in relation to 'chiefdoms', 'bands' or 'states'. 
Spatial or abstract time lends justification to the idea of necessity in 
the historical process, that things could not be otherwise, they had to 
haopen this way, Ultimately, it orovides a justification for 
capitalism. 
We need to inquire into the meaning of such tempora!ity -- the time 
of measurement and calculation. Is such a conception of time itself 
atemooral? We arisue that temoorality is itself histori ca l, that any 
definition of history is itself historical, and reject any chronology 
which would claim universality. 
History since the French Revolution has changed its 
role . Once it was the guardian of the past: now it 
has become the midwife of the future. It no longer 
speaks of the changeless but, rather, of the laws of 
change which soare nothing . .. Social life which once 
offered an examo le of relati ve oermanence is now the 
guarantor of impermanence (Berger 1984, 12 ). 
Change is transformat ion, metamorphosis of the object. It belongs 
to th e object. But chronololj'y is an index, a law applying to all 
events , a sing le all powerful force. Change under the law of chronology 
becomes an aspect of time itself. Time as chronology is abstract and 
inhuman, the law or principle wh i ch applies to everyt hing. No longer a 
condition of social exi stence and li fe , time becomes sentence and 
puni shment. The ar chaeologis t becomes the executor of the law and 
people become the dehumanised objects of a spatialised hi s tory. 
Con temporary chronology flows; the past is lost in the distance, in 
the unceasi ng flow, exotic, mysterious and a problem. The past is no 
longer organically related to the present. The present instead rep -
resents ephemerality. It is itself l-0s t in the flow. Such a notion of 
time clearly corresponds to the impermanence and obsolence of 
consumerism, but also r e fer s to the oossibility of social change in the 
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non-Western world, the promise of social revolution. So, contemporary 
historical existence, historicity, is both violence and possibili~Y. --
violence to life (either overtly or in a symbolic form) and containing 
the possibility of revolution and change (Berger 1984). 
Capitalism's chronometry is the calculus for organising ~nd pro-
. · l b ur It is a time which al lows the cal cul at 10n and 
~ramming a o • . 
~ompar i son of incommensurate labours. It is. an ideo!ogy of product ion. 
Chr~nometric time is money and chronometry 1s the time of t~e fact?ry 
clock. Private life and public life become separated as le1sure-t1me 
and work-time. Lived time is marginalised, times other than .ch_ronometry 
destroved, condemned as subjective, irrational or as superstition. 
To sav this is not to long for an age before capitalism's 
colonisation of time. Contemporary historicity is the emergence of a 
sense of possibilitv, a possibility enabling a prospect of social 
·ustice that the present may be changed because it is not under the 
~uardia~ship of a mythical past. What is required is the unravelling of 
the i den ti f icat ion of chronology with the reality of time. Nature and 
history do not stand opposed to each other but exist in a mediatory 
relation: what appears as natural is a historical production and the 
identification of history with what happened -- objective occurence --
is dissolved in terms of the concrete existence of the past. 
Consequently, the time of the past is not to be assimil~ted i~to the 
time of the archaeologist but should be realised as d1scont1nuous, 
something more than its representation by the archaeologist. 
Substantial Time And Social Praxis 
Time is to be grasped in relation to particular processes. The~e-
fore it is substantial, neither a dimension nor a context. The notion 
of context is to be subverted. Context is not an external framework; 
there is no stable 'event' and its 'context'. Temporal interval does 
not consist of emptiness. Time exists in the relation between presence 
and absence, both ohysical and temporal. Intervals are a part of pre-
sences, defining, marking edges, structuring difference. There is 
always a chronic recioroci ty between past, present and future. So the 
archaeological oast always exists as a future project in the present, in 
the social oract ice of archaeolo<;y. No time then exists in-itself as 
abstract date or whatever. Time is not an abstract existence, content-
less form. A notion of substantial time means that we must reolace the 
usual archaeological notion of a fundamental gap between past and 
present ('bridged' by so-called middle ranl\'e theory) with an en!irely 
different notion in which oast and present are held together 1n the 
event of presencin[. Presencing understands the present itself as 
historic rather than the termination point of history. It is a "mutual 
• d t II (H • d reaching out and opening up of future, past an presen e1 egger 
1972 , 14), holding them together in their difference, in a relational 
nexus. Such a t emporality stresses the productive role of the archaeo-
logist now in creating.!! past in.!! present. There are always g~ps in 
the pas~These gaps are not just a feature of the amount of evidence 
that survives now but are always-already there. The past is not some-
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thing 'perfect' or over and done with, opposed to an ongoing uncompleted 
'imperfect' oresent. The past ~9.uires completion by the interoreting 
archaeologist (see Shanks and Tilley 1987, Chapter 1). The time of the 
oast belongs to the past but the meanin~ of the past resides in the 
present. 
Time is a condition of social practice in which social actors draw 
on structures which enable action, the action in turn reproducing the 
structures. So every social act implicates different temporalities: 
the occasion or event of the action; the life history of the social 
actor; and the institutional time of structure. This is the social 
logic of 'scale'. Time, then, is the event of praxis , the praxis of 
past social actors and the praxis of the archaeologist today. 
In arguing against an 'Hegelian' total ised and abstract time, 
Althusser proooses multiple temporalities within a social formation --
times specific to the separate instances: economic, political, legal and 
ideological (Althusser and Balibar 1970, Chapte r 4) . There is thus no 
single unifying time, no sin<?le 'now'. The only unity to different 
temporalities is their location within a structured social formation. 
While not suoporting Althusser's characterisation of 'social formation' , 
we agree that time is unavoidably imolicated in social logic. 
Consequently chronology does not explain anything, nor does it 
provide a context. Instead chronology is oart of that which is to be 
understood. Time may not involve chronology, as we shall illustrate 
below. Svnchronicity does not necessarily mean at the same date; at the 
same date does not mean that two events were necessarily synchronous. 
Dates act as taxa, uniting 'events• according to an abstract calculus. 
We argue instead that any form of synchrony and diachrony arises out of 
and must be related to the social structures of which it is a part. 
This means that we must replace the abstract landscape of quantitative 
and soatial time with substantial time, an eventful landscape of conti-
nuity and discontinuity : structured difference. Instead of length of 
time we should refer to the dens ity of relations of practice. 
~ History Of Times 
The essential ooint to be made is that different temporal orien-
tations shape history itself. "The moment i s a moment" comments 
Bourdieu reporting an Algerian oeasant (1963, 59). Time for the 
Algerian oeasant is not measured but marked . There are not spatial 
oolnts of division, segments of rel\'Ular succession, but self-enclosed, 
discontinuous units. Points of reference are supplied by experi ence of 
the a<?ricul tural cycle: a ritual calendar. The peasant temporal i ty of 
tradition is not coincident with chronolo<?y (Table 1). 
The measured time of abstract chronology, to be managed, 
calculated, saved and exoended, is distinct from the oeasant's substan-
tial time, a mythology in action, a submission to the passage of time, 
with no one dream in<? of 'saving time' or 'spending time'. The futur e in 
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SUBSTANTIAL OR HUMAN TI'1E 
marked time 
submission to the 
passage of time 
self-enclosed recurrent 
moments 
the forthcoming exalted 
by tradition 
imitation of the past; conformity 
with an ancestral model 
concrete horizons of the present; 
single context of meaning 
reading signs to which tradition 
orovides the key 
deferred consumption (hoarding) 
gift 
social imperative 
ABSTRACT 00 CHRONOUXHCAL TIME 
measured time 
managed time 
repetitive segments of 
regular succession 
the future: an ooen void 
design of a projected future 
mutually exclusive possibility 
'rational' calculation 
abstract accumulation 
credit 
'rational r choice 
Table 1. Substantial and Abstract Time . 
abstract time is a void of mutually exclusive possibilities. The time 
of the peasant is a time to be forecasted, a forthcoming within a single 
context of meaning. Additionally, the concrete horizon of the present 
is exalted by tradition, an imitation of the past in conformity with an 
ancest ral model. To presume to calculate the future is hubris. Abstract 
time's rational calculation of future possibility opposes substantial 
time's orophetic r eading of signs for which tradition furnishes the key, 
a reduction of possibility. Substantial time 's provision for the forth-
coming involves hoarding and concrete deferred consumption, standing 
opposed to abstract accumulation in chronometric time. The substantial 
~ift, with debt a soci a l and moral issue, is distinct from abstract 
c redit. Social imperative opposes rational 'economic' choice. 
Reason (1979) locates what he terms the 'textual time' of the 
oeasant and capitalism's abstract time in the organisation of production 
and relates this distinction to different forms of classification. 
Socialised production of the peasant family is oriented towards use -
val ues of anticipated oroduct, qualitatively distinct and strictly not 
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commensurable. Accounting practices and orientation to abstractly 
corrmensurable exchange-values are inapplicable. Peasant work time is 
substantial, rooted in concrete labour; «work time is a physiogonomy of 
subsistence« (Reason 1979, 229). Conversely, capita! ist labour pre-
suoposes an abstract temporal frame: time is money. Reason opposes 
abstract reoetitive temoorality to a textual time, a temporality 
constituting and: 
constituted in, the narrative account as the prime 
formula for reflecting (upon) the courses and causes 
of events, and which orovides the essential means of 
exolicatin~ the sense of the accomolished facts of 
Iife •.• With textual time, we deal not with a 
dimension but with a way of grasping one's living 
(ibid. 230-1). 
He relates textual time to a world composed by exemplification -- «the 
production of signs which 'possess' that to which they refer" (ibid. 
237): categorisation as opposed to a system of classification. 
Classification implies a separation of sign and sense, an arbitrary 
signifier with a stable structure of rules, articulable criteria of 
identity which transcend the particular occasion. Reason here refers to 
Saussure•s observation that in linguistics «as in oolitical economy we 
are confronted with the notion of value: both sciences are concerned 
with a ~stem for equating thi~ --;;-!different orders -- labour and 
wages in one and signifier and signified in the other" (Reason 1979, 
241, citing Saussure 1974, 79). In both, time is an indexible quality. 
These orders of temporal i ty are cl early i mpl i ea ted in social practice. 
It should also be noted that they are not mutually exclusive; we can 
understand the time of the peasant, just as the peasant can understand 
chronology. The important point is the structural !:_tlat ion £f. .!l.1!!!!. .!.£ 
social oractice, the social and historical production of time. Levi-
Strauss writes: 
The charact er istic feature of the savage mind is its 
timelessness; its ob.iect is to itraso the world as 
both a svnchronic and a diachronic totality and the 
knowledge it draws therefrom is like that afforded 
of a room by mirrors fixed on opposite walls, which 
reflect each other (as we 11 as ob.i ec t s in the 
intervening soace) although without being strictly 
parallel. A multitude of images forms 
simultaneously, none exactly like any other, so that 
no single one furnishes more than a partial 
knowledge of th e decoration and furniture but the 
group is characterised by invariant properties 
expressing a truth. The savage mind deepens its 
knowledge with the help of .!.!!!agines ~di. It 
builds mental structures which facilitate an 
understanding of the world in as much as they 
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resemble it. In this sense savage thought can be 
defined as analogical thou~ht (Levi-Strauss 1966, 
263). 
Levi-Strauss has distinguished systems of totemic classification 
from history. In the totemic system 'history' is eliminated or inte-
grated; in the Western present the historical process is internalised 
becoming a force of change. As we have demonstrated above, Western 
chronometric time transcends discontinuity and difference, closing gaps, 
relating events and objects to one another. By contrast the totemic 
system remains faithful to a timeless model of the past, the authority 
of tradition, the legitimacy of absolute antiquity. The mythical past 
appears as separate from the present. The ancestors or creators were 
different from ordinary people, their imitators. The mythical past is 
joined to the present because nothing has been happening since the 
appearance of the ancestors except events whose repetition and 
recurrence periodically overcomes their particularity. The historical 
process is not denied but admitted as form without content. 'Before' 
and 'after' exist, but each reflects the other. 
The traditional is the predictable, bringing past into present, 
shortening chronoloey into present memory and model of the mythical 
oast. This oredictabilitv is not the mechanical predictability of the 
identification of orediction and explanation which depends on a tempora-
lity of date and sequence. It is a predictability ~hich arises ·from 
incorooratine or ecllosing historicity, a oredictability which is a 
social accomol ishment. 
The rhvthm and nature of social change is related to social 
temporality. Tradition's temporality is short, a thin overlay on the 
authority of a timeless and mythical past, Chronology is thus 
compressed. We might say that tradition's temporality is of a different 
'scale' to that of contemporary Western historicity. We can make refe-
rence here to Gurvi tch's (1964) typology of time. He specifies the 
oarameters and forms of social time and relates these to types of social 
irames and societies. His eight forms of social time depend on differ -
ent relations between past, present and future, greater and lesser 
duration, continuity and necessity, and qualitative and quantitative 
elemen ts. Types of time he identifies include enduring time involving 
the projection of th e Past into the present and the future (ibid. 31). 
Other t yoes of time are cyclical time in which past, present and future 
are mutually projected into one another with an accentuation of 
continuitv and a weakening of contingency with the qualitative element 
emphasised (ibid. 32); explosive time wher e the Present as well as the 
oast are dissolved in the creatio;-or' an immediately transcended future. 
Discontinuity, contingency and the qualitative are maximised (ibid. 33). 
Other t yoes are ~tl .!_ived .!..!.!!!~ as opposed to controlled and mastered 
time. 
Gurvitch's social frame s and societies, correlated with these 
different times, include: social l eve ls (ecological base, oractice, 
symbo 1 and va 1 ue sys terns, collective consci.ousness ), interpersonal and 
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intergroup relations, structured and unstructured soci~l gr~ups ~such as 
kinshio groups, organisations), social classes, archaic, h'.storica~ and 
contemoorary societies. While we oppose the strong typological bas~s ~f 
such work it is 11evertheless a useful heuristic. What needs emPhas_is 1s 
the social oroduction of times -- their relation to det_erm1nate 
structures of oower and interest. So we need t.o _consider .the 
ideolo~ical implications of the temoorality of trad1t1on (described 
above) and the relationship between writing and time. 
Writing transforms the temoorality of tradition, exte.nd.ing t!me, 
bringing the absent present in th e graphical trace. Writing first 
appears as a list , as a means of storage. No longer the_ stora~e .of 
ritual information in the memory of the initiate in tradition, writing 
allows the creation and control of information, of records and archiv~s 
(Cf. Goody 1978). As such it is the basis of the developme~t of su~v~1-
llance and forms of social control. fnscr ipt ion is durat 10n; writ 1ng 
transforms temporal i ty, but temporal i ty itself is not neutral . As an 
aspect of social practice, temPorality is related to social control, 
written into relations of power. 
Temoorality And Social Change 
Time does not form merely a container within which social life is 
played out but constitutes a medium through whic~ social relati~ns are 
produced and reproduced. Time is a social oroduct1on and accomplishment 
and in turn, is actively involved in social reproduction and trans-
for~ation. The temoorality of small-scale societies is inconceivable 
apart from the social relations in which it is embedded just as 
capitalist production is bound UP with an abstract spatial. ti me. 
Traditional archaeolo~ical practices resulting in the formulation of 
chronolo~ies and periodisation of materials depend upon and presuppose 
the as o c i a l 're a l i t y I of a 1 i near and abs t r a c t t i me sup Po s e d 1 Y 
applicable throughout history. We argue instead that each s~cia_l _P~ac-
tice , each society and each event has its own rhythms and per1od1c1t1es, 
its own time. 
Such a perspective se ri ously questions the validity of traditional 
archaeological conceptions of time, and the implicit identificatio~ of 
time with change (related to 'probl ems' of the reality of archaeolog1~al 
period isations and how transitions might develop. betwee_n them>. _social 
change is not a single movement pervading the entire social totality ~ut 
is articulated in time and space forming a medium for the restructuring 
of social relations. Both temporality and spatiality form components of 
social life in a situational social context in which purposeful human 
agency (s structurally positioned. This positioning serves to shape 
day -to- day activities and alterations in their f or_m and na_t ur_e •. Space 
and time are socia lly produced as concrete material spat1al1t1es and 
temooralities (e.g. the time-space of ~rchitectural forms.> an? as~ set 
of relations between individual s and groups . Such space-time 1s neither 
abstract nor apart from human soc ial existence but dense: filled up with 
the contents of social existence rel ated dialectically to society's 
image of itself as a continuing form. The social constitution of time 
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and space is not just a routinised process but one pregnant with contra-
dictions, conflicts and struggles. Space and time form a medium for the 
networking of power and ideology In relation to competing interests and 
social s tra teg i es of i ndi vi duals and groups. Power, ideology, confl i et, 
space and time can only be understood relationally. Each is shot 
through and partially encompassed by the others. Furthermore, all these 
concepts are not neutral but critical categories which can be turned in 
on themselves and in relation to an analysis of the social production of 
archaeological knowledge. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that time in archaeology is not to be conceived as 
iust something manifested in, for examole, C-14 chronology or pub-
lication dates. Time is not a neutral device simply utilised to measure 
the traces of the oast. Time is always political (where the term 
political refers to the manner in which social relations ought to be 
organised). Archaeology itself is a mediated relation between what 
haopened and its representation in the present, a mediation between 
bein~ historical and doing history: the social production of archaeolo-
gical knowledge. So our historicity and the understanding of the social 
determinants underlying contemporary archaeological practice are part 
of the orocess of exolaining the oast. This is simply to say that the 
past is temporally inseperable from the ~!!..!. of archaeolo[.Y_ i.e. 
excavation and the production of texts. Archaeology is not simply 
filling out an empty abstracted time with the decaying or embalmed 
debris of history. Archaeology's appropriation of the past is a moral 
and oolitical act. Choosing a past, that is constituting a past, is 
choosing a future. The ideology of contemporary archaeology's 
temporality is that it is imposing a Western evaluation of measured 
abstract time on a multitude of oasts which cannot answer for themselves 
-- even the dead aren't safe. The event of doing archaeology becomes 
dis~uised in a separation of oast and present with oresent disappearing 
and past becoming a spectacle, entertainment, illustration. 
1. The most soohistic11ted discussion of time in archaeology has been 
oroduced by Bailey (1983). We do not have space here to discuss 
Bailey•s work which we have critically assessed elsewhere as oart of a 
more detailed discussion of the relationship between time and archaeo-
logical theory and oractice (Shanks and Tilley in press). 
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